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SEPARATING PREEMPTION FROM THE SUBJECT 




With what seems to be a fluke of history, the Supreme Court has 
developed a subject matter analysis framework embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 
101 that relies on the preemption doctrine to justify invalidation.  This 
Article establishes that preemption has a distinct objective that is more 
closely aligned with the written description framework of § 112 than with 
the subject matter eligibility framework of § 101.  As a result of relying 
on preemption, the Court has created an arbitrary and difficult to apply 
test, resulting in a chasm between the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) and courts that is reminiscent of the 
difficulties in the patent system that lead up to the Patent Act of 1952. 
In response, this Article proposes a new framework that separates 
the preemption analysis from the subject matter eligibility analysis.  
Under this new framework, subject matter eligibility would revert to its 
pre-Benson approach, where judicial exceptions only cover natural 
phenomena, natural laws, and abstract ideas but not their equivalents.  
Further, this new framework is based on an objective standard where a 
claim is determined to be overly broad if it covers more than what the 
inventor has established they invented or modifications that are obvious 
to a person having ordinary skill in the art.  After developing the new 
framework, this Article applies the approach to Parker v. Flook, 
Diamond v. Diehr, and Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services, LLC.  This analysis demonstrates the new framework, provides 
a reasonable explanation for why the field limitation in Flook is not 
sufficient for satisfying claim breadth, which was unclear in the Court’s 
decision, and addresses the issues around the perceived per se law 
against medical devices. 
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Society benefits through the liberal reward of inventiveness1 so 
long as the reward is for novel2 and non-obvious3 creations known to the 
inventor.4  This statement reflects the idea that patents promote the 
progress of science by granting a time-limited exclusive right to the 
 
 1.  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011). 
 4. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853) (“For aught that we now know some future 
inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a 
distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or 
combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His invention may be less complicated—
less liable to get out of order—less expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if 
it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it 
without the permission of this patentee.”). 
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invention,5 but that progress may be stalled if patents are rewarded for 
known innovations, trivial improvements,6 or are so broad as to cover 
future innovations.7  While this statement may seem self-evident, it is 
not a reflection of where the patent system and its case law have been or 
where it currently stands. 
For example, before the Patent Act of 1952 (“1952 Act”), the courts 
struggled to articulate a reasonable test for inventiveness (what is now 
known as non-obviousness), creating at times confusing and difficult to 
apply laws.8  In probably the best-known case on the subject, Cuno 
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,9 the Supreme Court 
articulated a test that required a “flash of creative genius” to satisfy 
inventiveness and, further, that the genius must be apparent from the 
invention.10  This test was perceived by many to be confusing and 
difficult to apply, and it took an act of Congress in the 1952 Act before 
predictability was restored to the patent system.11  In the 1952 Act, 
Congress replaced the subjective “flash of genius” test articulated by the 
Court with a more objective framework based on being “obvious . . . to 
a person having ordinary skill in the art,” which they embodied in 35 
U.S.C. § 103.12  This new framework proved very useful and set the stage 
for the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.,13 to develop the 
standards necessary to analyze cases against that framework, setting the 
modern obviousness test by which the courts and USPTO would judge 
patents.  As a result of this effort, the doctrine of non-obviousness, and 
the doctrine of novelty have formed the cornerstone of modern 
patentability. 
 
 5. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 8-9 (“[Jefferson] rejected a natural-rights theory in 
intellectual property rights and clearly recognized the social and economic rationale of the 
patent system. The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural 
right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new 
knowledge.”). 
 6. See id. at 9 (“Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, 
and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly. 
Jefferson did not believe in granting patents for small details, obvious improvements, or 
frivolous devices.”). 
 7. See O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113. 
 8. David K. Mroz & Umber Aggarwal, Patent Law Could Use Another Judge Rich 
Right Now, FINNEGAN (Nov./Dec. 2017), 
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/patent-law-could-use-another-judge-rich-
right-now.html. 
 9. Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). 
 10. Id. at 91 (“That is to say the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the 
flash of creative genius not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its 
right to a private grant on the public domain”). 
 11. Mroz & Aggarwal, supra note 8.   
 12. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952). 
 13. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
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Courts find themselves struggling to formulate reasonable and 
predictable tests once again, but this time it is around subject matter 
eligibility.  The Court has long recognized that implied in the subject 
matter eligibility framework of 35 U.S.C. §101 is the recognition that 
some subject matter—abstract ideas, natural phenomenon, and laws of 
nature—are so fundamental to science that patenting them would 
preempt the future progress of science.14  However, courts have 
struggled to distinguish when a claim crosses the line from patent 
eligible subject matter to cover subject matter that should be deemed 
patent ineligible.  Under the modern framework, the Supreme Court 
supplied a two-part test in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank (“Alice”).15  Under 
this test the court first considers whether the claim is “directed to” 
ineligible subject matter, and, if so, whether the claim recites an 
“inventive concept” that “transform[s] the nature of the claim” into 
patent-eligible subject matter.16  However, since the Alice decision, the 
patent system has struggled to consistently and reliably apply this 
framework to determine when a patent is directed to patent eligible 
subject matter or not.17  As Judge Plager of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit said, “[t]here is little consensus among trial judges (or 
appellate judges for that matter) regarding whether a particular case will 
prove to have a patent with claims directed to an abstract idea, and if so, 
whether there is an ‘inventive concept’ in the patent to save it.”18 
This uncertainty has not gone unnoticed by litigators.  There has 
been a ten-fold increase in the number of claims deemed ineligible under 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“§ 101”), and a nine-fold increase in the number of 
patents invalidated.19  Many commenters, echoing concerns leading up 
to the 1952 Act, have argued the court has once again created a 
subjective, and at times arbitrary, test for measuring patentability.20  As 
 
 14. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012). 
 15. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 16. Id. at 217. 
 17. See generally Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc) (containing eight separate opinions disagreeing on the 
application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence with four concurring with 
the en banc denial and another four dissenting from the decision); Daniel R. Cahoy, Patently 
Uncertain, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2019) (statement of Hon. Paul R. Michel 
(Ret.)) (“I spent twenty-two years on the Federal Circuit and nine years since dealing with 
patent cases, and I cannot predict in a given case whether eligibility will be found or not 
found.”). 
 18. Cahoy, supra note 17, at 38. 
 19. See Dani Kass, Alice Axed Claims From Over 1,000 Patents In 5 Years: Study, 
LAW360 (Sept. 3, 2019, 10:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1194300/alice-axed-
claims-from-over-1-000-patents-in-5-years-study. 
 20. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017) [hereinafter IPOA]. 
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they point out, Alice has blurred the lines between subject matter analysis 
of § 101 and the non-obvious/novelty analysis of § 102 and § 103, and 
worse yet, imported an inventiveness standard reminiscent of the 
standard the 1952 Act sought to abolish.21 
While these are valid concerns, the more fundamental issue, and the 
one this Article focuses on, is that the framework established in Alice 
relies on a fundamental assumption that the subject matter eligibility 
doctrine—a doctrine concerned with what subject matter should receive 
protection—can and should be used to address issues relating to 
preemption—a doctrine concerned with not patenting the future.  This 
Article recognizes that the two doctrines have largely co-existed for over 
200 years.  However, this coexistence has been due to the courts laissez 
faire approach to subject matter eligibility.22  But recent case law has 
brought new life to the subject matter eligibility analysis and has started 
to show the incompatibilities of the two doctrines. 
Since Alice, there has been a considerable amount of scholarly work 
focusing on how the decision has blurred the lines between subject 
matter analysis and the non-obvious/novelty analysis.23  However, there 
has been far less discussion exploring the mixing of preemption analysis 
with subject matter analysis.  This Article is timely as the courts and 
Congress continue to struggle with the subject matter eligibility 
framework introduced by Alice.24 
This Article contends that the fundamental issue of the modern 
subject matter analysis framework is that it mixes the subject matter 
eligibility analysis with the preemption analysis, and that the objectives 
of the two analysis are inherently incompatible.  Part II of this Article 
reviews the history of patent invalidation, starting with the history that 
culminated in the 1952 Act.  This period of time is instructive as many 
of the issues that existed at that time parallel the issues faced by the 
patent system now, and the objective framework introduced by the 1952 
 
 21. See id. at 3. 
 22. KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45918, PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT 
MATTER REFORM IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 15 (2019) (“Development of the patent-eligible 
subject matter law was primarily left to the Federal Circuit, whose decisions generally 
expanded patentable-eligible subject matter, such that by the late 1990s Section 101 became 
perceived as ‘a dead letter.’ ” ). 
 23. See generally IPOA, supra note 20. 
 24. See, e.g., Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc) (providing a fractured opinion on the proper application of 
the Supreme Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence); see also Press Release, Thom Tillis U.S. 
Senator for N.C., Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release 
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Act can likely serve as a starting point for developing a new framework 
for measuring preemption.  The section then moves to the more recent 
challenges around subject matter eligibility, and the modern case law 
that has culminated in the Alice/Mayo framework for subject matter 
analysis.  Finally, the section discusses some of the criticism of the 
framework and potential congressional reform proposed by Senators 
Tillis and Coons. 
Part III of this Article looks at two doctrines that have formed the 
foundation of subject matter analysis: the judicial exceptions doctrine 
and the preemption doctrine.  The section starts off with a discussion on 
the origins of each doctrine and shows that while the two have 
historically been intermixed, the objectives that each are intended to 
progress are quite different.  Further, the section contends that because 
the preemption doctrine conditions patentability on only covering what 
is known, and not whether it is directed to a particular subject matter, it 
is wholly inappropriate to form part of the subject matter analysis 
framework.  Building off that distinction, the section then tries to address 
the question of why the two doctrines became intermixed.  Finally, the 
section concludes with highlighting the key issues that have resulted 
from intermixing the two doctrines paying particular attention to the 
court’s use of concepts of novelty and non-obviousness as a proxy for 
addressing the objectives of the preemption doctrine. 
Building on the premise that the preemption doctrine and subject 
matter eligibility have two distinct objectives, Part IV focuses on 
creating a framework that can adequately address the objectives of both 
doctrines.  This section first contends that because subject matter 
eligibility is concerned with distinguishing applications from principles 
and the preemption doctrine is concerned with not protecting the 
unknown, the two doctrines are inherently incompatible, and should not 
form the same analysis.  The section then moves on to establish a new 
framework to analyze claims by.  The framework moves the preemption 
analysis to after the initial § 101 threshold test and introduces an 
objective standard to measure claims by.  Finally, the section concludes 
with several examples illustrating how the framework would work in 
practice. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The challenges facing the U.S. patent system are nothing new.  The 
Court’s focus on invalidating patents often tracks with public sentiment 
towards the patent system.  Whether this is the court recognizing a flaw 
in the patent system, or simply the court reflecting the mood of society 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  But what is clear is that while the 
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Court’s increased attention on the patent system can be challenging at 
first, such pushes have helped the patent system to progress from being 
a convoluted and muddied body of law, reminiscent of its English 
origins,25 to a body of law that is predictable and efficiently progresses 
science. 
A. The Inventiveness Issue 
The depression of the 1890s would cast an unfavorable light on the 
patent system.  The monopolistic practices of big companies had resulted 
in the dire economic crisis that the United States was facing and patents 
were perceived as promoting that system.26  Many people strongly 
opposed the patent system, and courts reflected that sentiment through 
frequent invalidation of patents.27  Congress’s response at that time was 
to target the monopolistic practices of the big companies through the 
enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act, leaving the patent system 
largely unaffected.28 
However, following the Great Depression, the Court would once 
again set its sights on the patent system.  During this period, the courts 
routinely invalidated patents relying on a concept of inventiveness that 
was not only subjective, but at times arbitrary.29  Eventually, the Court 
settled on an “inventive genius” test.30  The test proved hard to manage 
in practice and created an “ever-widening gulf” between the Patent 
Office and the courts.31  The disparity between patents the USPTO 
deemed valid and patents the Court deemed invalid came to a head in the 
famous case of Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 
where Justice Douglas declared that a patent “however useful it may be, 
must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the 
calling.”32  This statement ignited a vigorous debate in the patent 
community with Justice Jackson famously commenting “that the only 
 
 25. H. Jared Doster, The English Origins of the Judicial Exceptions to 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
A.B.A. (Mar./Apr. 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/2018-
19/march-april/english-origins-judicial-exceptions-35-usc-section-101/. 
 26. See A brief history of the patent law of the United States, LADAS & PARRY (May 7, 
2014), https://ladas.com/a-brief-history-of-the-patent-law-of-the-united-states-2/. 
 27. Id.; see also Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 
YALE L. J. 848 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2699964. 
 28. See A brief history of the patent law of the United States, supra note 26. 
 29. See IPOA, supra note 20, at 3; see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United States 
Patent Act in the Light of Comparative Law I, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 307-08 (1954). 
 30. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 154 
(1950). 
 31. Riesenfeld, supra note 29, at 308. 
 32. Id. at 307; Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941). 
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patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its 
hands on.”33 
In response, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1952 to realign the 
Patent Office and the courts.  The 1952 Act formalized the concept of 
inventiveness, providing an objective framework for its measurement.34  
While at first it was unclear whether the 1952 Act would have the 
stabilizing effect that Congress intended,35 the Supreme Court in 
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City laid those concerns to rest.36  
In its decision, the Court set the stage for our modern understanding of 
non-obviousness which has become the cornerstone of patent 
eligibility.37  In its decision, the Court first recognized that 35 U.S.C. § 
103 codified one hundred years of judicial precedent on determining 
inventiveness and made it an express condition on patentability.38  
Second, the Court recognized that the statute abolished the controversial 
“flash of creative genius” test.39 
While, the 1952 Act did not address all questions of patentability, 
in particular those around what it means to be obvious,40 the Court 
believed those difficulties were comparable to ones “encountered daily 
by the courts in such frames of reference as negligence and scienter, and 
[would] be amenable to a case-by-case development.”41  In its decision, 
the Court foresaw a “uniformity and definiteness which Congress called 
for in the 1952 Act” so long as the courts strictly adhered to the 
requirements set forth in Graham.42  A vision that would turn out to be 
true. 
 
 33. Riesenfeld, supra note 29, at 308. 
 34. Id. at 308-09 (“Section 103 fixes an objective standard of invention by specifying on 
the one hand that ‘a patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would 
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art to which said subject matter pertains,’ and by declaring on the other hand that ‘patentability 
shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.’ In addition, the new 
act elevates the presumption of validity to the dignity of a statutory mandate.”). 
 35. Id. at 309 (“Whether these provisions will have the desired ‘stabilizing effect’ 
remains to be seen . . . . Perhaps the most that can be said is that Congress has ‘expressed a 
mood.’ ” ). 
 36. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1966). 
 37. See id. at 13-14. 
 38. Id. at 14. 
 39. Id. at 15. 
 40. Id. at 18. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). 
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B. The Subject Matter Issue 
By the 1990s, the United States saw an explosion in the number of 
patents granted that mirrored the explosion in technology.43  However, 
the economic woes following the bursting of the dot-com bubble, and 
subsequent emergence of entities whose sole purpose was asserting 
patents obtained from these defunct companies at fire sale prices would 
once again sour public sentiment towards the patent system.44  Many 
argued that the patent system was replete with examples of overly broad 
claims that resulted from the liberal grant of patents during the explosion 
in the 1990s.45  In response, the Court, relying on earlier case law, began 
a campaign to invalidate these broad patents by focusing on subject 
matter eligibility.46  The rationale being that an overly broad claim 
directed to ineligible subject matter is a patent on the ineligible subject 
matter itself. 
1. Initial Subject Matter Analysis 
The first Supreme Court case to take on the issue in this period was 
Bilski v. Kappos.47  The claim in Bilski was directed to a method for 
hedging against price-fluctuations in the energy and commodity 
markets.48  While the Court recognized that “[h]edging is a fundamental 
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught 
in any introductory finance class,”49 which would have likely served as 
a valid ground for invalidation under novelty, it did not consider whether 
the patent was invalid on novelty or non-obviousness grounds.  Rather, 
because § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is a threshold test, the Court only 
needed to consider the other requirements of patentability only if §101 
was satisfied.50  Relying on earlier precedent, the Court determined the 
concept of hedging was “an unpatentable abstract idea,” as the claims 
were so broad that they would preempt use of the abstract idea in all 
fields and would in effect grant a monopoly on the idea itself.51 
 
 43. PETER MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE: 2018: PERSPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS 282 (2018). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Beauchamp, supra note 27, at 850. 
 46. See Erin E. Block & Eric Chadwick, Subject Matter Eligibility post Alice: A Boon 




 47. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 48. Id. at 599. 
 49. Id. at 611. 
 50. Id. at 602. 
 51. Id. at 611-12. 
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The Supreme Court was not alone and Congress also responded to 
concerns about overly broad patents by introducing the biggest reforms 
to patent law since the Patent Act of 1952 with the America Invents Act 
(AIA).52  Congress’s approach was to improve the efficiency of 
invalidating patents by creating a new administrative law body, the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), with the purpose to decide issues 
of patentability, and add more trial like administrative procedures, 
including post-grant review (PGR), and inter partes review (IPR).53  
However, while the AIA may have created a more efficient process for 
invalidation,54 it did not substantively change or clarify the law around 
what constitutes a valid patent.55  This would be left to the courts. 
2. Modern Alice/Mayo Framework 
Following the AIA, the Supreme Court heard Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (“Mayo”).56  The Court’s 
rationale in Mayo is of particular interest as it served as the basis for the 
Court’s decision in Alice and would form the foundation of what became 
the Alice/Mayo test for subject matter eligibility. 57  The claim in Mayo 
was directed to a method for optimizing dosage of thiopurine drugs for 
treating autoimmune diseases by administering the drug, measuring a 
metabolite, and adjusting the dosage based on that measurement.58 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Bryer held that the 
invention was directed to patent ineligible subject matter—a law of 
nature.59  The Court reiterated earlier warnings that overly broad patents 
risk preempting future development and “that a process that focuses 
upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other elements or a 
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive 
concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”60  To reach 
 
 52. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).   
 53. See id. §§ 6-7. 
 54. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, COMMERCE, RULES OF PRACTICE FOR TRIALS 
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PATENT TRIAL 
AND APPEAL BOARD DECISIONS 2 (2012), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/general_trial_rules.pdf (“The 
purpose of the AIA . . . is to establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will 
improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs”). 
 55. One notable exception is the AIA changing the U.S. patent system from a first-to-
invent to a first-to-file system. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3. 
 56. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 57. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); see HICKEY, supra note 22, 
at 16. 
 58. Mayo Collaborative Services, 566 U.S. at 72. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 72-73. 
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its conclusion, the Court first noted the claims “set forth laws of nature—
namely, relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in 
the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove 
ineffective or cause harm,”61 and that the question was whether the 
patent claims “add enough” to the natural law for the process to qualify 
as patentable subject matter.62  In addressing this question, the Court 
reviewed the claim on an element by element basis finding that each 
element was “well-understood, routine, conventional activity already 
engaged in by the scientific community” and “when viewed as a whole, 
add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately.”63  
By its analysis, what the Court had done, was to set a rule that if a claim 
recites a law of nature, it is presumptively invalid, and the claim must 
recite something novel for it to be classified as patent eligible subject 
matter.  A formulation that continues to be criticized.64 
In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, the Court would solidify the Mayo 
decision as a two-part test and extend it to abstract ideas.  The Court 
considered whether a patent directed to system for mitigating 
“settlement risk” was an abstract idea.65  Largely relying on Bilski, the 
Court first held that the patent was directed to an abstract idea.66  It noted 
that similar to risk hedging in Bilski, “the concept of intermediated 
settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our 
system of commerce.’ ” 67  Similar to Bilski, the Court did not consider 
whether the patent should have been invalidated on novelty or non-
obviousness grounds.  In addition, the Court took the position that a 
longstanding fundamental practice is an abstract idea.68 
The Court, echoing Mayo, noted that the second step of the analysis 
is the search for an “inventive concept” that is “sufficient to ‘transform’ 
the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”69  However, 
instead of relying on the well settled law of non-obviousness in § 103 to 
determine the inventive concept, the Court proceeded through a more 
comparative analysis by measuring the claim in question against other § 
 
 61. Id. at 77. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  at 79-80. 
 64. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. 
Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc); IPOA, supra note 
20. 
 65. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 213 (2014). 
 66. Id. at 218-20. 
 67. Id. at 219. 
 68. Id. at 220 (“[A]ll of the claims at issue [in Bilski] were abstract ideas in the 
understanding that risk hedging was a ‘fundamental economic practice.’ ” ). 
 69. Id. at 221. 
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101 decisions.70  Relying on those decisions, the Court ultimately found 
that the implementation of a generic computer did not transform the 
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.71 
While the Mayo decision would have a substantial impact on the 
examination of medical diagnostic applications,72 the Alice decision had 
far broader implications.  Not only did applicants see a sharp increase in 
§101 rejections at the USPTO, particularly in the computer science 
fields,73 but the number of issued patents deemed invalid increased ten-
fold.74  Not surprisingly, litigators have tried to use the increase in 
invalidation to their advantage, and have stepped up their §101 attacks 
in the courts.75  In response to the challenges applicants faced at the 
USPTO, Director Andrei Iancu has issued a number of guidelines to 
assist both applicants and examiners.76  Whether or not these guidelines 
have helped still remains to be seen; however, it is clear that their reach 
in alleviating the issues faced by patent holders in the courts is limited, 
or worse yet, counter-productive.77 
3. Criticism of Alice/Mayo Framework 
The Alice/Mayo framework has been praised for reducing the 
number of overly broad patents.78  However, it has also received a 
substantial amount of criticism.79  One criticism is targeted particularly 
at Mayo for having a detrimental impact on innovation. 80  Many have 
 
 70. See IPOA, supra note 20, at 16 (“But [the Court] did not simply import the 
longstanding obviousness standard under § 103 into the § 101 analysis. Rather, the ‘inventive 
concept’ analysis appears to be a far more arbitrary exercise, dependent on comparisons of 
the claims at issue to claims in other § 101 opinions.”). 
 71. Alice Corp. Pty., 573 U.S. at 226-27. 
 72. See Colleen Chien, The Impact of 101 on Patent Prosecution, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 21, 
2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/10/impact-patent-prosecution.html (“[Among 
medical diagnostic applications] the 101 rejection rate grew from 7% to 32% in the month 
after the Mayo decision and continued to climb to a high of 64%”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. IPOA, supra note 20, at 22 (noting that patent invalidations increased from an 
average of one to five per quarter prior to the Alice decision to almost fifty patents per quarter 
following Alice). 
 75. See Kass, supra note 19. 
 76. See e.g., Notice, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019). 
 77. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 Fed. Appx. 1013, 
1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“While we greatly respect the PTO’s expertise on all matters relating 
to patentability, including patent eligibility, we are not bound by its guidance.”). 
 78. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 79. See HICKEY, supra note 22, at 20-23. 
 80. See IPOA, supra note 20, at 2; HICKEY, supra note 22, at 22. 
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argued Mayo has created a per se rule against diagnostic devices,81 as 
they are directed at a law of nature —the detection of the law of nature—
and use “data gathering steps or devices that can be said to be basic, 
conventional, or obvious.”82  But, as Justice Chen noted, these devices 
“intuitively seem to be the kind of subject matter the patent system is 
designed for.”83  That is, “to encourage the risky, expensive, 
unpredictable technical research and development that people would not 
otherwise pursue in the hope that if they discover something of great 
medical value, then they will be protected and rewarded for that 
successful effort with a patent.”84 
Critics have also argued that the uncertainty caused by the 
Alice/Mayo framework has put the United States at a disadvantage to its 
competitors.85  One rationale is that the current state of patentability in 
the U.S. after Alice has created what one commenter has dubbed 
“investment-killing” uncertainty.86  Only after sinking considerable 
costs into the development of an invention along with the costs of 
prosecution and maintenance, has the investor found that, not only are 
they unable to protect their investment against infringers, but their 
invention has been contributed to the public as a result of the required 
disclosure.87  Given that there is little consensus among the judges (trial 
or appellate) about whether a given claim is subject matter eligible, there 
is little an investor can do to minimize the risk caused by this 
uncertainty.88  At best, the patent system becomes a pure gamble for the 
inventor. 
Critics have also pointed out that not only does the framework 
hinder innovation, it is also legally flawed.89  The congressional intent 
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 reflects Jefferson’s belief that innovation should be 
liberally rewarded.90  The Alice/Mayo framework, in contrast, introduces 
“extra-statutory” requirements that significantly limit what is classified 
as patentable subject matter which some argue is “contrary to 
congressional intent or the constitutional purpose of patent law.”91  In 
 
 81. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1350 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made 
clear that detecting a law of nature (without more than conventional steps for accessing the 
law of nature) does not qualify as a patent-eligible application of a law of nature.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1352. 
 84. Id. 
 85. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 22-23. 
 86. Cahoy, supra note 17, at 6. 
 87. See id. at 14-17. 
 88. See id. 
 89. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 21-22. 
 90. Id. at 1. 
 91. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 21. 
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addition, the Alice/Mayo framework undermines the intent of the 1952 
Act by intermixing elements of novelty and non-obviousness with the 
subject matter analysis.92 
While the Alice/Mayo framework may be helpful in invalidating 
patents that are particularly low quality,93 it has come at the expense of 
also invalidating countless other patents.94  The issues facing the 
Alice/Mayo framework raises serious questions about whether it will be 
part of subject matter eligibility analysis of the future, or whether it will 
face the same fate as the “flash of creative genius” test articulated in 
Cuno.95  Many agreed that Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Services, LLC (“Athena”),96 was the opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to salvage the Alice/Mayo framework and add much 
needed clarity to the subject matter analysis.97  However, the Court 
refused to hear the case, and it seems to have left it to Congress to bring 
much needed changes to the 35 U.S.C. § 101.98 
4. Potential Congressional Reform 
In an attempt to reform § 101, Senators Thom Tillis and Chris 
Coons revived the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property.99  On April 17, 2019, they “released a bipartisan, bicameral 
framework on Section 101 patent reform” which was later revised on 
May 22, 2019 after receiving feedback.100  But while the Tillis-Coons 
framework is a recognition that § 101 needs reform, it may be years 
before it will have any effect, if ever.  After a considerable amount of 
effort, no draft bill is in sight, and while the bill is not dead per se, it is 
 
 92. See generally IPOA, supra note 20. 
 93. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 94. IPOA, supra note 20, at 26 (“Using section 101 to invalidate poor quality patents is 
like using a sledgehammer to crack walnuts: it’s hard to stop the damage at just the shell. 
What distinguishes a good quality patent from a bad one is unrelated to the requirements of 
eligibility”). 
 95. See id. at 5. 
 96. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 97. See Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Pleads For Patent Eligibility Clarity: What Now?, 
LAW360 (July 10, 2019, 9:13 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1176454. 
 98. Eileen McDermott, It’s Official: SCOTUS Will Not Unravel Section 101 Web, 
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/13/scotus-will-not-
unravel-section-101-web/id=117800/. 
 99. Press Release, Patent Reform Framework, supra note 24. 
 100. Id.; Press Release, Thom Tillis U.S. Senator for N.C., Sens. Tillis and Coons and 
Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release Draft Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the 
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“on life support.”101  The main obstacle holding up the bill is reaching a 
consensus on the statutory language.102 
However, a more fundamental issue with the Tillis-Coons bill, and 
the majority of discussions around § 101 reform, is the inability to 
reconcile two competing objectives that currently exist in subject matter 
analysis.  The first objective embodied in the original Congressional 
intent of § 101 is to promote the progress of science through the liberal 
reward of inventiveness.  The second objective embodied in the 
preemption doctrine is to prevent hindering the progress of science by 
granting a reward that is too broad.  Historically, both objectives have 
been reflected in the subject matter analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 101.  
However, except in the most extreme cases, the courts have struggled to 
adequately satisfy both objectives in a single test.  The remainder of this 
Article focuses on identifying the root cause of the issues and proposing 
a framework that would progress both objectives. 
III. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS IS DISTINCT FROM SUBJECT MATTER 
ELIGIBILITY 
The judicial exceptions have been part of the U.S. patent system 
since the mid-nineteenth century and trace their origins to the English 
courts where they were imported into U.S. law by the Court in Le Roy v. 
Tatham.103  From the outset, the court recognized that while abstract 
principles, and natural laws are not patentable, the applications may 
be.104  For 120 years, subject matter eligibility was a relative low bar to 
overcome, and “merely required that the patentee ‘carry the principle 
into effect, however simple and self-evident such means may be.’ ” 105  
While principles that underlie preemption would occasionally be used to 
justify classifying a claim as a judicial exception, they generally were 
not used to distinguish a principle from its application.106   
 
 101. Richard Lloyd, Even if you forget about 101 reform, don’t forget about DC, IAM 
(Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/even-if-you-forget-about-101-
reform-dont-forget-about-dc. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Doster, supra note 25; HICKEY, supra note 22, at 12-13 (“Le Roy relied on influential 
English patent cases to set forth a basic distinction between abstract ‘principles’ and natural 
laws (which may not be patented) and practical applications of those principles (which may 
be patented).”); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
 104. Doster, supra note 25; HICKEY, supra note 22, at 11-12. 
 105. MENELL ET AL., supra note 43, at 277. 
 106. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) 
(“Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these bacteria can be mixed 
without harmful effect to the properties of either is a discovery of their qualities of non-
inhibition.”); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“[The 
Court assume[d], without deciding the point, that [the] advance was [an] invention even 
though it was achieved by the logical application of a known scientific law to a familiar type 
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However, the Court would change this long-standing position in its 
first case to consider subject matter eligibility following the 1952 Act.  
In Gottschalk v. Benson,107 the Court declared that the claim was 
ineligible because it was “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both 
known and unknown uses of the [principle]” and that if the patent were 
to be upheld, it “would wholly pre-empt the [principle] and in practical 
effect would be a patent on the [principle] itself.”108  The analysis in 
Benson has complicated patent law as it is not clear at what point claim 
breadth crosses the line from covering a principle to covering its 
application.  Recent cases such as Alice and Mayo have tried to address 
this question, but they have come up short.  This section contends that 
the Court’s failure is a direct result of trying to apply principles of 
preemption and claim breadth to address issues of subject matter 
eligibility. 
A. Subject Matter Eligibility—Judicial Exceptions 
The principles of subject matter eligibility are embodied in § 101 
and reflect the idea that inventiveness should be liberally rewarded.109  
However, the court has long recognized that implicit in § 101 is the 
principle that some subject matter is so fundamental to science that 
society never benefits if it is excluded.110  The foundation of the judicial 
 
of antenna.”); Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931) (“Addition of borax 
to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an article for use which 
possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property.”); Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 
U.S. 1, 534 (1888) (“In the present case the claim is not for the use of a current of electricity 
in its natural state as it comes from the battery, but for putting a continuous current, in a closed 
circuit, into a certain specified condition, suited to the transmission of vocal and other sounds, 
and using it in that condition for that purpose.”); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 726-7 
(1880) (clarifying that the claim in question in O’Reily v. Morse was invalidated because “[i]t 
was not a claim of any particular machinery, nor a claim of any particular process for utilizing 
the [natural phenomenon]; but a claim of the [natural phenomenon] itself”); Corning v. 
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 263 (1853) (“ ‘ A mere principle . . . is an abstract discovery; but a 
principle, so far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a condition to 
act and produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation, becomes the practical 
manner of doing a practical thing. It is no longer a principle, but a process.’ ” ); O’Reilly v. 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120 (1853) (“That is to say—[Morse] claims a patent, for an effect 
produced by the use of electro-magnetism distinct from the process or machinery necessary 
to produce it.”). 
 107. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 108. Id. at 68-72. 
 109. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (“In choosing such expansive terms . . . 
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws 
would be given wide scope. Congress took this permissive approach to patent eligibility to 
ensure that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.’ ” ). 
 110. See, e.g., Neilson v. Harford (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1270 (noting that inventors 
have “no right to take out [a] patent for a general notion or principle”); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 
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exceptions is that “[t]he concepts covered by these exceptions are ‘part 
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none,’ ” 111 and any invention must come from its 
application.112   
For example, in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,113 the 
Court considered whether a patent directed to selecting strains of 
bacteria for “leguminous plants” such that they did not inhibit each other 
was patent eligible.114  At the outset of its opinion, the Court noted that 
the inventor did not modify the bacteria in any way to generate the 
inhibition, rather the inhibition was a product of nature.115  The Court 
continued, that the products of nature such as “the heat of the sun, 
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of 
knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”116  As a result, the Court held that the claim was patent ineligible 
as the combination “produces no new bacteria [and] no change in the six 
species of bacteria,” and the discovery was only for “some of the 
handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable.”117 
Thirty-two years later, the Supreme Court would decide the 
companion case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty.118  In Chakrabarty the Court 
considered whether a “human-made, genetically engineered bacterium 
capable of breaking down crude oil” was patentable subject matter.119  
Echoing Funk Bros., the Court noted that “a new mineral discovered in 
the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject 
matter” as “[s]uch discoveries are ‘manifestations of. . . nature, free to 
all men and reserved exclusively to none.’ ” 120  However, unlike Funk 
Bros., the claim in question was not to an “unknown natural 
phenomenon, but to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or 
composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a 
 
U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; 
a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right”). 
 111. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602. 
 112. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 113. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. 127 
 114. Id. at 128 n.1 (“The product claims in suit are 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, and 14. Claim 4 
is illustrative of the invention which is challenged. It reads as follows: ‘An inoculant for 
leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of 
different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains being unaffected by each 
other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for which they are 
specific.’ ” ) 
 115. Id. at 130. 
 116. Id. 
 117. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 14; Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130-32. 
 118. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 119. Id. at 303. 
 120. Id. at 309. 
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distinctive name, character [and] use.’ ” 121  As a result, the Court held 
that the claim did not cover a judicial exception as the bacteria was 
human-made and possessed “markedly different characteristics from any 
[bacteria] found in nature.”122 
Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty represent the underlying principles of 
the judicial exceptions which is that some subject matter is so 
fundamental that it would be inappropriate to limit societies access to it.  
These are the “building blocks” of science, contained in the “storehouse 
of knowledge,” that should be “free to all men and reserved exclusively 
to none.”123   
B. Preemption 
In contrast to the judicial exceptions, the fundamental premise 
behind preemption is that an inventor should only be rewarded for what 
they create and not for what is unknown.124  The rationale being that 
granting such a right would prevent future improvements on the 
technology, limiting the progress of science.125  In one of the earliest and 
most influential cases on the subject, Chief Justice Taney stated in 
O’Reilly v. Morse,126 a case concerning Samuel Morse’s invention of the 
telegraph: 
For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward 
march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a 
distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using 
any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s 
specification.  His invention may be less complicated—less liable to 
get out of order—less expensive in construction, and in its operation.  
But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, 
nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this 
patentee.127 
 
 121. Id. at 309-10. 
 122. Id. at 310. 
 123. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Berkheimer 
v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 
U.S. 208, 208-09 (2014). 
 124. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (“Here the ‘process’ claim is so 
abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary 
conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ 
licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing 
machinery or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.”). 
 125. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) 
(“[B]asic tools of scientific and technological work’ . . . might tend to impede innovation more 
than it would tend to promote it.”). 
 126. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 127. Id. at 113. 
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More recently, the Supreme Court has echoed these same principles 
in Gottschalk v. Benson, which considered a “method for converting 
binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals” for use with 
general purpose computers.128  The Court found the claim drafted in such 
broad terms as to cover both “known and unknown uses” with such uses 
“vary[ing] from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ 
licenses to researching the law books for precedents” or “be performed 
through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without 
any apparatus.”129 
What the case law has shown is that preemption analysis, at its core, 
is a question of claim scope.  Is the claim narrow enough to cover only 
what is known to the inventor or is it so broad as to preempt future 
development by covering both the known and unknown applications?  
This objective is far more aligned with the written description 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) than it is the subject matter eligibility 
of § 101.130  Despite this, courts have routinely mixed preemption 
analysis with subject matter analysis.131  The literature is not clear why 
the courts have taken this approach.  It may be partly historical, as 
preemption has been used since O’Reilly v. Morse to justify the judicial 
exceptions.132  It may also be one of utility, as preemption has had 
success in distinguishing principles from applications in extreme 
cases.133  However, whatever the reason, the objectives of the two 
doctrines are quite distinct, and as recent case law suggests, 
incompatible. 
C. Genesis of Intermixing Preemption and Subject Matter Eligibility 
While Morse and Benson are helpful to understand the role 
preemption plays in patent analysis, the difficulty with these cases, and 
most cases relying on a theory of preemption, is that the preemption 
analysis is often intertwined with, and difficult to separate from, the 
 
 128. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64. 
 129. Id. at 68. 
 130. Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Section 112 states that 
‘[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to 
make and use the same . . . .’ This requirement ensures ‘that the inventor actually invented the 
invention claimed.’ ” ); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an 
applicant from later asserting that he invented that which he did not”). 
 131. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 63; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 66 (2012); Alice Corp. Pty. v. 
CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). 
 132. See generally O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 133. See generally Benson, 409 U.S. at 63. 
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subject matter analysis.  For example, in Benson, the Court initially 
relied on a preemption style analysis of the claim, noting the claim 
covered both “known and unknown uses.”134  However, it built off of 
that analysis to review the claim from a subject matter perspective, 
concluding the claim “would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula 
and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”135 
There is a distinction in how early case law, and more modern cases 
have used preemption in their subject matter analysis.  Generally, earlier 
cases considered the preemption doctrine to be a justification for 
classifying a claim as a principle instead of an application in extreme 
cases.136  These cases tend to have more to do with the fact that the claims 
are for natural processes, but with some manifestations of a physical 
form that make it more difficult to simply classify it as such.  Later cases 
on the subject have taken a step further from simply using preemption to 
justify a classification and incorporated the objectives of the preemption 
doctrine into its subject matter eligibility analysis.137  While earlier case 
law has shown that combining preemption analysis with subject matter 
eligibility can work in the most extreme cases, as evidenced by the 120 
years of case precedents,138 extending that approach to analyze cases that 
deviate from these extremes has caused considerable issues in the more 
modern context. 
1. Origins of Issue 
The court has long recognized that inventions should be rewarded 
not for the discovery of a natural principle, but its application.139  In one 
of the cases that was instrumental in shaping patent eligibility doctrine 
in the U.S., the English Court of the Exchequer considered whether a 
patent for the improvement in the application of air in a bellow driven 
furnace was for the discovery that applying hot air to a furnace improved 
efficiency—which is a principle—or for the mode of applying the hot 
air—its application.140  The court ultimately concluded that, while the 
patent was broad, it was directed to the “mode of applying [the principle] 
 
 134. Id. at 68. 
 135. Id. at 72. 
 136. Id. at 71-72 (“The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical 
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment 
below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in 
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 138. If you exclude Flook and Benson, the case precedents are far longer. 
 139. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 160 (1852). 
 140. Neilson v. Harford (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1266-67. 
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by means of a mechanical apparatus to [the] furnace” and therefore a 
patent-eligible application. 141 
The principle-application distinction from Neilson v. Harford,142 
would influence the Supreme Court in Le Roy.143  While the Court did 
not decide the case in Le Roy on subject matter grounds, it did import 
the distinction of non-patentable natural laws from the practical 
application of those principles.144  The Court stated that while a principle 
cannot be patented, a “new property discovered in matter, when 
practically applied, in the construction of a useful article of commerce 
or manufacture, is patentable.”145  As the court noted, “invention is not 
in discovering [the natural principles], but in applying them to useful 
objects.”146 
However, by the 1970s personal computers were emerging and 
there was a recognition that these systems significantly blurred the lines 
between an unpatentable principle and a patentable application, and a 
considerable debate raged as to whether computer programs were 
patentable.147  The Court confronted this issue head on in Gottschalk v. 
Benson when it considered a claim for a method to convert binary coded 
decimal numbers into pure binary numbers using a general purpose 
computer.148  While the Court ruled the claim covered unpatentable 
subject matter, it did not rule the claim was for an abstract idea.149  
Rather, the Court ruled that the claim was “so abstract and sweeping” as 
to be in practical effect “a patent on the algorithm itself.”150 
To reach this conclusion, the Court had to expand the judicial 
exceptions beyond the original three categories—abstract ideas, laws of 
nature, and natural phenomenon—to include the equivalents thereof.  
While Benson might have been considered on §112 grounds, the 
rejection on § 101 grounds reflected a skepticism as to whether computer 
programs were patentable in the first place.151  Since Benson, the patent 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266.   
 143. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). 
 144. See id. at 174-75. 
 145. Id. at 175. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (“Uncertainty now exists as to 
whether the statute permits a valid patent to be granted on programs. Direct attempts to patent 
programs have been rejected on the ground of nonstatutory subject matter. Indirect attempts 
to obtain patents and avoid the rejection, by drafting claims as a process, or a machine or 
components thereof programmed in a given manner, rather than as a program itself, have 
confused the issue further and should not be permitted.”). 
 148. Id. at 64. 
 149. See id. at 68-72. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 72-73. 
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system has become more accepting of such patents, but Benson has left 
a legacy of skepticism towards subject matter eligibility of software 
patents.  As a result, the Court has relied on, and developed case law 
around invalidating suspect patents on subject matter grounds despite the 
fact other grounds may be more appropriate or manageable. 
2. Parker v. Flook 
In Parker v. Flook,152 the Supreme Court built off of its original 
expansion of the scope of the judicial exceptions in Benson.153  The claim 
in question was directed to a method for dynamically adjusting alarm 
limits in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons which relied on a 
mathematical formula.154  What makes this case particularly fascinating, 
and quite distinct from Benson, is the claim did not “wholly preempt the 
mathematical formula” since it was only directed to the petrochemical 
and oil-refining industries. 155  Yet, despite this, the Court held the claim 
was directed to an unpatentable judicial exception.156 
To reach its conclusion, the Court deviated substantially from 
precedent.  Instead of asking whether the claim was so broad as to 
effectively be the mathematical formula, as was the case in Benson, the 
Court asked whether the “claim’s elements, individually and as an 
ordered combination, contain[ed] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to 
transform the claim into patent eligible subject matter.”157  That is, after 
removing all that was well known and routine from the claim, if the only 
thing left was the mathematical formula, it covered ineligible subject 
matter.158  In the case of Flook, the Court found that after removing the 
mathematical formula, the claim only consisted of well-known 
processes, techniques, and methods and, therefore, must cover ineligible 
subject matter.159 
Flook has been criticized for its incorporation of elements of 
novelty and non-obviousness in its subject matter analysis.160  Yet, more 
 
 152. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 153. See generally id. 
 154. Id. at 585-86. 
 155. Id. at 589-90. 
 156. Id. at 594-95. 
 157. IPOA, supra note 20, at 8. 
 158. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (“Here it is absolutely clear that respondent’s application 
contains no claim of patentable invention. The chemical processes involved in catalytic 
conversion of hydrocarbons are well known, as are the practice of monitoring the chemical 
process variables, the use of alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values 
must be recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for ‘automatic monitoring-
alarming.’ ” ). 
 159. See id. at 594-95. 
 160. IPOA, supra note 20, at 7-9. 
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fundamentally what Flook shows is the difficulties with intermixing 
preemption analysis with subject matter analysis.  The Court having 
found that the claim in Flook did not fall into the same extreme category 
as Benson, it proceeded to develop a new test relying on the concept of 
inventiveness to distinguish an application from a principle.161  
However, this approach serves neither the purpose of subject matter 
eligibility nor of preemption.  First, whether or not elements of a claim 
are “novel or independently eligible for patent protection is irrelevant to 
the question of whether the claims as a whole recite subject matter 
eligible for patent protection under § 101.”162  Similarly, whether a claim 
element is inventive is immaterial as to whether the elements add 
meaningful limitations to a claims scope. 
3. Diamond v. Diehr 
Three years after Flook, the Supreme Court appeared to correct the 
subject matter analysis in Diamond v. Diehr,163 but they would not 
provide any replacement for how to handle overly broad claims.164  The 
patent in Diehr was directed to a process for molding rubber that relied 
on the Arrhenius equation to determine curing time.165  As the Court 
pointed out, when determining subject matter eligibility, the claim 
should be “considered as a whole.” 166  It is “inappropriate to dissect the 
claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the 
old elements in the analysis.”167  Further, the fact that one or more of the 
steps “may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for patent 
protection is irrelevant to the question of whether the claims as a whole 
recite subject matter eligible for patent protection under § 101.”168 
Relying on this framework, the Court concluded that Diehr’s claim 
covered patent eligible subject matter.  However, instead of overruling 
Flook, the Court distinguished Diehr from Flook by noting that, unlike 
 
 161. See id. at 7-8. 
 162. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193 n.15 (1981). 
 163. Diamond, 450 U.S. 175. 
 164. POA, supra note 20, at 9 (“The dissent in Flook became part of the majority in Diehr, 
where the Court correctly rejected Flook’s point of novelty approach and its incorporation of 
novelty considerations in the eligibility analysis.”); Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“Mayo’s rationale 
thus follows the point of novelty/inventive concept reasoning of Flook and the Diehr dissent. 
As such, Mayo is in considerable tension with Diehr’s instruction to consider claims ‘as a 
whole’ and Diehr’s disapproval of dissecting claims into elements and ignoring non-novel 
elements in the § 101 analysis.”). 
 165. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177. 
 166. Id. at 188. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 193 n.15. 
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Flook, the patent “do[es] not seek to pre-empt the use of that 
equation.”169  But this distinction is rather unsettling as the Flook Court 
explicitly acknowledged that the patent did not “wholly preempt the 
mathematical formula.”170  To get around this, the Diehr Court classified 
this limitation as a field limitation, not accorded any weight in 
determining claim scope.171  However, the Court did not provide any 
explanation for why such a limitation should not carry any weight.  One 
possibility is that these types of limitations do not distinguish known and 
unknown applications, and preemption would still occur, albeit in a 
narrower respect.172  However, this is mere speculation as the Court did 
not articulate their rationale. 
4. Modern Preemption and Subject Matter Eligibility 
After Diehr, the Supreme Court did not decide another subject 
matter eligibility case for thirty years, and left the development of the 
law to the Federal Circuit.173  During that period, the Federal Circuit, 
building off of Diehr, significantly expanded the scope of subject matter 
eligibility to such an extent that invalidation due to subject matter 
ineligibility was rare.174  However, this changed in 2010 when the 
Supreme Court decided four cases in five years, starting with Bilski v. 
Kappos and eventually culminating into the Alice/Mayo two-step 
analysis.175 
In Bilski, the Court concluded that claims directed to the concept of 
hedging and its applications were unpatentable subject matter.176  But 
despite Diehr’s guidance,177 the Bilski Court imported from Flook the 
concept of inventiveness noting that well known techniques do not 
transform patentable ineligible subject matter into eligible subject 
 
 169. Id. at 176. 
 170. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). 
 171. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the 
protection of our patent laws . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to 
limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”). 
 172. See infra Section IV.B. 
 173. Diehr was decided in 1981 and the Court would not decide Bilski until 2010. 
 174. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2011) 
(“[A]fter 1998, patentable subject matter was effectively a dead letter.”); see also HICKEY, 
supra note 22, at 15. 
 175. HICKEY, supra note 22, at 16. 
 176. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010). 
 177. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193 n.15 (1981) (“The fact that one or more of the 
steps . . . may not, in isolation, be novel or independently eligible for patent protection is 
irrelevant to the question of whether the claims as a whole recite subject matter eligible for 
patent protection under § 101.”). 
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matter.178  The Court further embraced this approach in Mayo v. 
Prometheus.179  In Mayo, after the Court first quickly concluded that the 
claim in question was directed to an unpatentable law of nature, it then 
dissected the claims into their component parts and held that each claim 
element consisted of “well-understood, routine, conventional activity 
already engaged in by the scientific community” that add nothing to the 
law of nature.180  The modern framework for subject matter eligibility 
analysis was finalized in Alice by the Court implementing a two-step 
test. 
Under Alice, the first step of the framework is to ask whether the 
claim is directed to patent ineligible subject matter.181  To be directed to 
a patent ineligible subject matter, the claim as a whole must focus on the 
ineligible subject matter, and not just involve the subject matter.182  
However, this determination is done in consideration of the state of 
art.183  If the claims are directed to ineligible subject matter, the Court 
then searches for an “inventive concept” that “ ‘ transform the nature of 
the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”184 
The Alice/Mayo framework suffers from the same flaws as Flook 
and seems to ignore Diehr’s guidance to view the claim as a whole.185  
While “[t]he Court indicated that it had considered the claim ‘as a 
whole,’ . . . it did so by reviewing the claim on an element-by-element 
basis in search of something new and inventive, discounting the formula 
as ‘assumed to be within the prior art.’ ” 186  What this approach does is 
ignore meaningful limitations on the application of an abstract idea or 
 
 178. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (“These claims attempt to patent the use of the abstract idea 
of hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct the use of well-known random analysis 
techniques to help establish some of the inputs into the equation”). 
 179. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 
(2012). 
 180. Id. at 79-80. 
 181. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 218 (2014) (“We must first 
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.”). 
 182. Id. at 217 (“At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary 
principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, 
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.’ Thus, an 
invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract 
concept.”). 
 183. IPOA, supra note 20, at 15 (“In its analysis of step one, the Court supported its 
conclusion that the claims in Alice were directed to an abstract idea by considering the state 
of the art.”). 
 184. Alice Corp. Pty., 573 U.S. at 217. 
 185. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Chen, J., concurring) (“As such, Mayo is in considerable tension with 
Diehr’s instruction to consider claims ‘as a whole’ and Diehr’s disapproval of dissecting 
claims into elements and ignoring non-novel elements in the § 101 analysis.”). 
 186. Id. at 1344. 
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natural principle, and claim that by an application becoming known it 
can no longer serve as a claim limitation. 
There is no better example of the difficulties that have been caused 
by the Alice/Mayo framework than with Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. 
Mayo Collaborative Services (“Athena”).187  The claim in Athena was 
directed to a method for diagnosing neurological disorders by detecting 
antibodies to the muscle specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK) protein.188  As 
Justice Chen noted, this class of patents “intuitively seem to be the kind 
of subject matter the patent system is designed for: to encourage the 
risky, expensive, unpredictable technical research and development.”189  
Yet, following the Mayo framework, “after setting aside the law of 
nature, ‘any additional steps consist[ed] of well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community; 
and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add[ed] nothing significant 
beyond the sum of their parts taken separately.’ ” 190  That is, once you 
remove the natural phenomenon from the equation, all the reviewer is 
left with is “well-understood, routine, conventional activities.” 
The question is, how do you distinguish cases such as Athena from 
cases that simply “implement an abstract idea using a computer,” such 
as in Benson?  Subject matter alone is wholly inoperative to serve as a 
distinguishing factor as both cases are directed to judicial exceptions.191  
Further, Athena shows that inventiveness is insufficient as once the court 
removes the judicial exception from the analysis, the claims contain only 
routine and well-known tools and steps.  The distinguishing factor seems 
to be one of claim breadth.  Does the claim cover both known and 
unknown uses so as to prevent future development?  In the case of 
Athena, the claim is directed to a particularly narrow application for 
diagnosing neurological disorders related to MuSK, which, unlike 
Flook, intuitively seems to only cover uses known to the inventor.192  The 
next section sets forth a framework for analyzing claim breadth and 
provides examples of the framework in action. 
IV. PATH FORWARD 
Most of the focus driving the recent changes to subject matter 
eligibility is to combat aggressive enforcement of overly-broad, low-
 
 187. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d. 743 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019). 
 188. Id. at 747. 
 189. Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1352 (Chen, J., concurring). 
 190. Id. at 1347. 
 191. See generally IPOA, supra note 20. 
 192. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d. 743, 747 
(Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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quality patents by non-practicing entities.193  However, the Court has 
struggled with creating reliable and predictable tests to invalidate such 
low-quality patents.194  As discussed above, the Court has relied on 
subject matter eligibility to address issues of claim breadth, with the 
rationale being that patents should not be awarded for claims that cover 
both the known and unknown.  However, to determine when a claim 
preempts an unknown application, the Court has relied on inventiveness 
concepts, which confuses the issue by mixing in elements of novelty and 
obviousness in the analysis.195  Whether a claim is novel or obvious is 
irrelevant to whether it claims known and unknown uses.  This section 
discusses the relevant considerations in developing a new framework for 
analyzing claim subject matter eligibility and determining when a claim 
is overly broad. 
A. Preemption Analysis Should Be Removed from Subject Matter 
Analysis 
The major issue with preemption and the judicial exceptions is that 
the Court has intermixed the two analyses in subject matter eligibility 
law.  The distinct objectives of the preemption doctrine and judicial 
exceptions make it difficult to create a predictable law capable of 
reasonably advancing both objectives.  At the heart of preemption 
analysis is the question of whether the claim covers both known and 
unknown applications of a principle.  The preemption doctrine 
recognizes that by awarding an exclusive right to unknown applications 
of an invention, the progress of science is impeded as the inventor 
controls the rights of any future developments.196  In contrast, the 
objective of the judicial exceptions is to ensure that the fundamental 
building blocks of science are not exclusive to any person. 197 
 
 193. Athena Diagnostics, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring) (“I, for one, 
would welcome further explication of eligibility standards in the area of diagnostics patents. 
Such standards could permit patenting of essential life saving inventions based on natural laws 
while providing a reasonable and measured way to differentiate between overly broad patents 
claiming natural laws and truly worthy specific applications.”); id. (Dyk, J., concurring) (“The 
Mayo/Alice framework has thus proven to be both valuable and effective at invalidating overly 
broad, non-inventive claims that would effectively ‘grant a monopoly over an abstract 
idea.’ ” ); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 85 (2012) (“The 
Court has repeatedly emphasized [claim breadth] concern, a concern that patent law not inhibit 
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.”). 
 194. See generally IPOA, supra note 20. 
 195. Id. at 10. 
 196. See HICKEY, supra note 22, at 24-25. 
 197. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); 
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). 
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While preemption analysis, as embodied in subject matter 
eligibility, has found utility in distinguishing an ineligible judicial 
exception from patent-eligible application in extreme cases, in its current 
form it does not establish whether the claim covers unknown uses.  What 
it does in these extreme cases is to short-circuit the subject matter 
analysis and conclude whether the claim is a principle or application is 
irrelevant if the claim is so broad that failing for preemption is a foregone 
conclusion.  While the Court has tried to extend this analysis to cover 
cases that deviate from these extreme examples, it has failed to create a 
reliable framework.   
Subject matter analysis is rooted in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which states 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”198  This language has remained 
virtually unchanged since the Patent Act of 1793.199  At the heart of the 
language is Thomas Jefferson’s view that inventiveness should be 
liberally rewarded.200  The Court has explicitly recognized that the 
Congressional intent of § 101 is for subject matter eligibility to be given 
a wide scope.201  The judicial exceptions provide an important 
counterbalance to this role by recognizing that some subject matter is so 
fundamental that providing such an award does not promote the progress 
of science.202   
There is an important debate to be had as to how broad the judicial 
exceptions should be.203  For example, should the judicial exceptions 
cover not only abstract ideas, natural phenomenon, and laws of nature 
but also equivalents thereof?204  However, this debate is independent of 
determining whether society should award a patent for claims that cover 
 
 198. U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 199. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski 
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“The criteria for patentability established by the 1793 Act 
remained essentially unchanged until 1952, when Congress amended § 101 by replacing the 
word ‘art’ with ‘process’ and providing in § 100(b) a definition of the term ‘process.’ The 
Supreme Court has made clear that this change did not alter the substantive understanding of 
the statute; it did not broaden the scope of patentable subject matter.”). 
 200. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1011. 
 201. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601 (“In choosing such expansive terms . . . modified by the 
comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide 
scope. Congress took this permissive approach to patent eligibility to ensure that ‘ingenuity 
should receive a liberal encouragement.’ ” ). 
 202. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); 
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). 
 203. See Lemley et al., supra note 174, at 1330 n.79. 
 204. See supra Section III.C. 
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both known and unknown applications.  While preemption may serve a 
useful justification for classifying a claim as covering a principle, 
intermixing the two in the subject matter analysis confuses the 
independent role that each one plays. 
In many ways, the preemption approach is remarkably similar to 
the written description framework of 35 U.S.C. § 112: 
[t]he purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an 
applicant from later asserting that he invented that which he did not; 
the applicant for a patent is therefore required to ‘recount his 
invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to 
be encompassed within his original creation.’205 
The Federal Circuit has at least once suggested the role of the 
written description requirement is to prevent the applicant from 
preempting future development.206  Yet, with what seems to be a fluke 
of history, the Court has not relied on § 112 for preemption analysis but 
rather intermixed it with subject matter eligibility.207  Worse yet, because 
§ 101 is a threshold question,208 determining claim breadth as part of 
subject matter eligibility has resulted in § 112 to not develop the 
necessary framework to analyze these claims.209  Therefore, it is crucial 
that any framework used to analyze a claim recognizes each doctrine’s 
distinct role and clearly establishes that preemption analysis is 
independent of subject matter analysis. 
One concern about removing preemption from the subject matter 
analysis is that it risks turning § 101 into a dead letter law, which can 
simply be overcome by crafty claim drafting.210  Given the low 
invalidation rates for subject matter eligibility during the 1990s, that 
concern would seem plausible.211  However, what this ignores is the role 
 
 205. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 206. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Claiming all DNA’s that 
achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the 
description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”). 
 207. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972). Benson was the first supreme court 
case covering computer technology and the Court chose to invalidate on subject matter 
grounds instead of written description grounds. Id. 
 208. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (“[T]hat process is at the very least not 
barred at the threshold by § 101.”); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (“The § 101 
patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.”). 
 209. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“Those sections [§ 102, § 103] and § 112 do not 
adequately address ‘the risk that a patent on the [natural] law would significantly impede 
future innovation.’ ” ). 
 210. Lemley et al., supra note 174, at 1318 (“[A]fter 1998, patentable subject matter was 
effectively a dead letter.”); see also HICKEY, supra note 22, at 15. 
 211. See HICKEY, supra note 22, at 15. 
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that subject matter eligibility plays.  That is, to act as a rough filter to 
weed out those claims that cover subject matter that is not suitable for 
receiving patent protection—such as principles—and, in many ways, to 
guide the innovator towards claims suitable for protecting—application 
of those principles.  This is a role that is well suited for the USPTO to 
fulfill, and one in which they were fulfilling long before Mayo and 
Alice.212  In addition, this concern ignores the court’s role in 
counterbalancing the breadth of subject matter eligibility with the 
judicial exceptions.  Removing preemption from the subject matter 
analysis does not remove judicial exceptions.  Rather, it clarifies that the 
two are distinct doctrines with their own objectives. 
B. A New Framework 
After removing preemption analysis from subject matter eligibility, 
the challenge becomes how to determine when a claim is so broad as to 
not deserve a patent.  Benson provides the obvious extreme.  That is, 
where a claim covers both all known and unknown uses it is too broad 
to receive patent protection.213  But beyond this extreme, the answer is 
less clear.  To arrive at an answer, there needs to be clarity around what 
is meant by not patenting unknown uses. 
One interpretation is that an innovator should not receive protection 
for what they did not invent prior to the claimed invention’s effective 
filing date.  There is some merit to this interpretation as it seems 
particularly unfair to grant an exclusive right to an innovator for 
something that they did not create.  However, this approach is flawed in 
two significant ways.  First, it is challenging to reasonably establish all 
uses known to the innovator at the time of filing an application.  This 
would likely require an enormous disclosure, making examination 
potentially unworkable.  Second, and most importantly, the approach 
focuses on what the inventor knows and not what would impede the 
progress of science, which is the preemption’s actual objective.214  
Whether or not an inventor knows of all uses is irrelevant to whether the 
exclusion would prevent future innovations.  As a result, this 
interpretation would very likely be underinclusive, potentially leading to 
absurd results in the courtroom with the court invalidating claims 
because an innovator did not establish they knew of an obvious 
modification covered by the claim, as well as potentially never-ending 
 
 212. See Chien, supra note 72. 
 213. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68-72 (1972). 
 214. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853). 
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specifications that claim every possible combination or uses to prevent 
such absurd results. 
The proper interpretation seems to be that under the doctrine of 
preemption a claim is overly-broad and should not be afforded protection 
if it covers more than what the inventor can reasonably establish they 
created, and any modifications that would be obvious to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA).  This approach’s main advantage is 
it removes the subjective nature of measuring what is known to the 
inventor, which is often amorphous and hard to define and relies on an 
objective measure for determining claim breadth.215  Another advantage 
is that the approach brings greater certainty to the applicant that the court 
will not invalidate their claims due to failing to establish they knew all 
potential applications of what the claim covers without impeding 
science’s progress.  It is important to note that while this approach does 
leverage the PHOSITA standard of § 103, this standard merely provides 
an objective measure to determine claim breadth and is not meant to 
intermix the obviousness analysis with the preemption analysis. 
C. Applications of the New Framework 
As discussed above, there are striking similarities between § 112 
and the preemption doctrine.  There is an important debate beyond the 
scope of this Article as to whether the claim breadth analysis should form 
part of the § 112 framework, and whether that analysis is compatible 
with that framework.216  However, what this Article has established is 
the analysis should not form part of subject matter analysis.  Further, the 
analysis should be measured using an objective standard.  For example, 
in Flook the Court was concerned with a claim that automatically 
updated an alarm limit in the field of catalytic conversion of 
hydrocarbons using a mathematical formula.217  Under this new 
framework, the Court would first consider whether the claim as a whole, 
irrespective of any issues of novelty, non-obviousness, or claim breadth, 
is a patent-ineligible abstract idea, or a patent-eligible application.  As 
the claim was directed to applying a mathematical formula to adjust an 
alarm limit in a chemical process, the Court would likely find the claim 
is directed to a patent-eligible application. 
 
 215. IPOA, supra note 20, at 3 (“In part as a reaction to this subjective ‘invention’ 
standard, Congress passed the Patent Act of 1952 with the intent that the scope of patent-
eligible subject matter be broad and that patentability would be determined on objective basis. 
This approach was codified in section 103, which bases patentability on non-obviousness, 
using the objective standard of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”). 
 216. See Lemley et al., supra note 174, at 1330 n.79. 
 217. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585-86 (1978). 
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Once patent eligibility is established, the Court then considers 
novelty, non-obviousness, written description, and claim-breadth.  
Under the claim-breadth analysis, the Court compares the claim against 
the specification and determines whether the claim only covers what the 
inventor has established they knew at the time of filling and any obvious 
modifications.  Under this analysis, it is easy to see why the field 
limitation in Flook does not save it from invalidation.  The field 
limitation not only would cover the intended scope of catalytic 
converters for removing pollutants,218 but would also cover any catalytic 
conversion of hydrocarbons including the production of fuels, synthesis 
of commodity chemicals, and any other process that involves converting 
hydrocarbons using any particular catalyst.  Modifications of Flook’s 
claimed invention to cover these fields would be far beyond obvious to 
one having ordinary skill in the art and, therefore, the claim would be 
correctly invalidated as overly broad. 
Diehr provides a nice counterexample to Flook.  Diehr’s claim was 
directed to “[a] method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision 
molded compounds aided by a digital computer” employing the 
Arrhenius equation for determining curing time.219  As the claim is for 
applying the Arrhenius formula to molding rubber, the Court would (and 
did) find the claim is patent-eligible.220  The question then is whether the 
claim is overly broad.  What makes Diehr distinct from Flook is the 
claim in Diehr is directed to a specific application of operating a rubber-
molding press for precision molded compounds, versus Flook that is 
directed to updating alarm limits in the field of catalytic conversion of 
hydrocarbons.  Where the claim in Flook conceivably covers 
applications in many areas beyond the intended application of catalytic 
converters, Diehr is specific in its application, and any modifications the 
claim covers would conceivably be obvious to those of ordinary skill.  
As a result, the Court would likely find the claim does not extend beyond 
the bounds of what the inventor knew or obvious modifications. 
Finally, in Athena, the claim was directed to a method for 
diagnosing certain neurological disorders by detecting antibodies to the 
muscle-specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK) protein.221  What is particularly 
interesting about Athena is it is very likely that the claim covers all 
 
 218. Parker v. Flook, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-642 (last visited Apr. 
10, 2021) (“Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a method of adjusting alarm limits in 
response to changes that occur during the catalytic conversion process [of a catalytic 
converter]”). 
 219. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 179 n.5 (1981). 
 220. Id. at 192-93. 
 221. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d. 743, 746-47 
(Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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conceivable applications.  However, it is hard to imagine any non-
obvious application of an antibody’s correlation to a disease, other than 
to diagnose the disease.  The inability to find an inventive concept for 
applying the natural law is why medical diagnostic patents have 
struggled to find patent eligibility.222  Yet many agree that the progress 
of science is hindered by not affording such invention protection.223  
What Athena reflects is the balance between hindering the progress of 
science by providing protection for overly broad claims and hindering 
the progress of science by not providing any protection.  It is irrelevant 
whether the claim or patent covers all conceivable applications of a 
principle, so long as it only covers what is known to the inventor and 
obvious modifications.  While science may not progress any further in 
that particularly narrow field by granting the patent, there is likely no 
more progress to be had in the field and science more generally will be 
hindered by failing to grant the patent. 
By framing the analysis in terms of what is known to the inventor, 
the new framework properly addresses Athena’s issues.  Under the new 
framework, a reviewer would likely find the claim as patent-eligible as 
it covers an application of a natural law—applying the correlation of the 
antibody to the disease to diagnose the disease—and not the natural law 
itself.  A reviewer would also likely find the claim is not overly broad, 
as it is directed to the specific application of diagnosing neurological 
disorders related to MuSK.  Even though the claim likely covers all 
potential applications of the natural law, it is not necessarily overly broad 
as all potential modifications of the application established by the 
inventor would be obvious to one skilled in the art. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, with what seems to be a fluke of history, the Court 
has developed a subject matter analysis framework that relies on the 
preemption doctrine to justify invalidation.  However, this Article has 
established that preemption has a distinct objective that is more closely 
aligned with the written description framework of § 112 than it is with 
the subject matter eligibility framework of § 101.  This Article suggests 
that the intermixing of preemption analysis with subject matter 
eligibility likely originated from the Court’s initial suspicion of subject 
 
 222. See Sanjeev Mahanta, Patent Eligibility of Medical Diagnostic Inventions: Where 
Are We Now, and Where Are We Headed?, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 14, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/04/14/patent-eligibility-of-medical-diagnostics-
inventions-where-are-we-now-and-where-is-there-to-go/id=108263/. 
 223. Id.; see also Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 
1333, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Chen, J., concurring). 
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matter eligibility of computer programs in Gottschalk v. Benson, which 
was further exacerbated in Parker v. Flook through the introduction of 
an inventiveness test.  While the Court would start to correct the record 
in Diamond v. Diehr, it would later reverse course and further embrace 
the inventive concept approach in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank.  As a 
result, the Court has created an arbitrary and difficult to apply test, 
creating a chasm between the USPTO and courts reminiscent of the 
period leading up to the 1952 Act. 
To address the issues the patent system currently faces, this Article 
proposes a new framework that separates the preemption analysis from 
the subject matter eligibility analysis.  Under this new framework, 
subject matter eligibility would revert to its pre-Benson approach where 
judicial exceptions only cover natural phenomenon, natural laws, and 
abstract ideas but not their equivalents.  Further, the preemption analysis 
would be based on an objective standard where a claim is determined to 
be overly broad if it covers more than what the inventor has established 
they invented or modifications that are obvious to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art.  After establishing the new framework, this 
Article shows that this new framework provides a reasonable 
explanation for why the field limitation in Flook is not sufficient for 
satisfying claim breadth which was unclear in the Court’s decision.  
Finally, this Article contends that under this new framework the claim 
in Athena would likely be found to be patent eligible, and not overly 
broad, a result that many agree is reasonable given the nature of the 
technology. 
